Agree with stalemate. They don’t have the force required to break the seige on Mariupol, for example. But are holding their own in other places.
Ukraine is beating the spread.
A lot of the information we’re getting in the west is pro-Ukraine biased for the obvious reasons. My impression is, after allowing for bias/one-sidedness, it’s currently either a stalemate or slow loss for Ukraine, with the potential for the tide to turn against Ukraine if Russia throws nastier weapons/tactics into the mix, or if supplies from outside dry up.
And British Kit Kats, which are much better than American ones.
Agreed hard to say you’re “winning” when you’re country is being blown to bits and you are suffering a lot of civilian casualties. But maybe this just goes to show there are no winners in war. Even when you win you still lose.
This is a good point. Perhaps better to say Ukraine is ‘successfully defending’ to this point rather than ‘winning’. The minimum win condition for either side remains unclear.
Should the conflict prolong to next winter, there will be a whole new set of problems for both sides. Russia wants to ‘win’ before then (they should want to in any case…they’re all too familiar with the interaction of weather and warfare).
I honestly can’t think of what would lead Putin to declare failure and withdrawn. It took the US decades to do that with Vietnam, which I think was similarly hopeless.
There is also the agricultural calendar to consider. Ukraine is a breadbasket but I can’t imagine there will be much seeding happening this spring unless the conflict ends soon. And it may be unable to harvest any winter wheat crop. Ukraine’s ability to feed its people and export its surplus agricultural products may soon be lost for a year.
The news is all about Russian tank columns being destroyed and Kyiv holding, making it seem like a Ukraine rout, but looking at this map from the NYT Russia has definitely gained a lot of ground in the south and East.
This commentary also raises some key points-
However, an exclusive focus on cities – though understandable – may obscure more than it reveals. Though it seems clearthat the initial Russian plan was based around a swift coup de main against Kyiv while the bulk of the Ukrainian army was pinned in the east opposite Donetsk and Luhansk, this is unlikely to remain the case. Even under best-case assumptions (from a Russian perspective), it is unlikely that Kyiv will be taken soon. However, it is worth considering that there is a second Ukrainian centre of gravity – alluded to by Vladimir Putin in his pledge to ‘demilitarise’ Ukraine – the regular Ukrainian army, most of which remains near Donetsk and Luhansk under the aegis of the Joint Forces Operation (JFO).
The position of this force is looking increasingly precarious as Russian forces advance to encircle it on three axes. Russian forces of the 58th Combined Arms Army and 22nd Army, pushing north from Crimea, have commenced assaults on Beryslav along the Dnieper, and appear likely to link up at Polohy with Russian separatist forces and the Eighth Combined Arms Army advancing from Donbas. Elements of the First Guards Tank Army and Sixth Combined Arms Army advancing past Kharkiv also appear to have largely eschewed attempts to take the city – focusing instead on reducing it with artillery while bypassing it as they advance south and west past Poltava, cutting the JFO off from escaping northwards. Finally, in the southwest, Russian forces of the 20th Guards Motor Rifle Division appear similarly intent on bypassing Mykolaiv but, notably, may not be advancing on Odessa. Instead, they appear to be advancing north, which could suggest a desire to seize the western banks of key crossing points over the Dnieper.
Viewed in conjunction, these advances present a troubling picture whereby the Ukrainian forces opposite Donetsk and Luhansk are at risk of encirclement on the eastern side of the Dnieper. If this is indeed the focus of Russia’s approach, then the emphasis on Russia’s ability to take major cities as a metric of success will have been an analytical error, as Russia appears more intent on pinning Ukrainian forces in cities like Kharkiv while it bypasses them.
For Ukraine, this represents a critical moment. The encirclement and destruction of a large part of the country’s regular armed forces could represent a victory condition for Russia in two ways. First, we might consider what figures like Jomini and Clausewitz postulated in the context of their own time: that armies and not cities are a nation’s centre of gravity. The destruction of armies tends to lead to a broader collapse of will that makes sieges unnecessary. In 1940, for example, German forces did not besiege Paris; having encircled the French army in the field and decisively beaten it, this became unnecessary. To hold Kyiv and other major cities at the cost of allowing the forces of the JFO to be encircled could prove disastrous. Even if Ukrainian will did not collapse following the encirclement and destruction of the JFO, the elimination of this force could lead Russia to claim it had achieved its goal of demilitarising Ukraine and would enable an annexation of Donetsk and Luhansk at a minimum.
Hopefully he doesn’t start bombing the Zelenskyy trail…
I hate to say it, but non nuclear realistic win conditions for putin might be a good thing.
What I don’t really understand is… if Russia isn’t willing to admit any form of defeat.. short of nukes, what is their endgame? They could throw more and more manpower at this until the end of time to prolong the stalemate.
True, but not having Russia takes over your country is worth an awful dang lot. Of course it would be better to not have to go to war to keep Russia out, but if those are the only two options…
I assume the US and others will gift them plenty of wheat, but it’s both heartbreaking and infuriating that they have to deal with this.
An excellent question. One possibility is that they just keep destroying buildings, killing people, starving the population.
They don’t win like they had originally intended – take over a country with a productive economy. But, they don’t lose either. Putin’s plan B may be to do so much damage and so much murder that other people on Russia’s borders will decide “it’s better to surrender at the beginning than be destroyed and killed over time”.
(We used to say “better red than dead”.)
Russia is the world’s largest exporter of wheat so maybe they will also deign to provide Ukraine some wheat after peace returns….
The end game is obviously to win, and they pretty much can win with 100% certainty. Because nukes. There is no short of nukes, nukes WILL be launched if this doesn’t go Putin’s way.
I don’t think they have enough money to do that without using nuclear weapons.
I don’t think that’s so obvious
This is exactly what he’d hope you think. Then when he sneezes in Latvia’s direction they quickly disarm. MAD doesn’t mean it’s one directional.
That’s an interesting point. In this case “money” means “factories that make artillery shells”. Also factories that make rockets and bombs and missiles. Maybe Putin runs out of deliverable conventional explosives.
He has to feed his own troops, but he would be feeding them if they were living in bases in Russia, so not that much extra cost.
He doesn’t have to destroy every building to make cities unlivable. Just cut off electricity and water. It’s harder to cut off food, but he can certainly make food supplies uncertain. Have enough explosions so people can’t sleep. Just make their lives miserable and don’t let up.