PSERS faulty calculation

I haven’t been bringing over my “pension watch” threads, but this particular controversy seems like it deserves something.

After Pennsylvania’s biggest pension plan botched a crucial financial calculation, the FBI launched an investigation, the fund’s board began its own probe, and 100,000 public school employees suddenly faced paying more into the retirement system.

Now The Inquirer and Spotlight PA have obtained new internal fund documents that shed light on that consequential mistake. The material traces the error to “data corruption” in just one month — April 2015 — over the near-decade-long period reviewed for the calculation.

The error was small. It falsely boosted the $64 billion PSERS fund’s performance by only about a third of a percentage point over a financial quarter. Even so, it was just enough to wrongly lift the fund’s financial returns over a key state-mandated hurdle used to gauge performance.

The documents reveal that a fund consultant, Aon, blamed the mistake on its clerical staff for inputting bad data. The material also shows that even though the fund hired a consultant, the ACA Compliance Group, to check the calculations, the consultant made only limited checks, and skipped over the month with the critical errors.

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Okay, finally getting around to SEC penalty

https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2024-9

SEC Charges Chicago-based Aon Investments and Former Partner with Misleading Pennsylvania Public Employees’ Pension Fund

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
2024-9

Washington D.C., Jan. 25, 2024 —

The Securities and Exchange Commission today announced settled charges against Aon Investments USA Inc., a Chicago-based registered investment adviser, and the firm’s former partner, Claire P. Shaughnessy, for misleading their client, the Pennsylvania Public School Employees’ Retirement System (PSERS), about the reason for a discrepancy between two different calculations by Aon of PSERS’s investment returns for the same period.

The SEC’s orders find that Aon was responsible for calculating PSERS’s investment returns for “risk share,” a provision under Pennsylvania law that requires public school employees to contribute more to their pensions if the retirement fund does not meet certain investment return rates. If PSERS’s investment return rate for the nine-year period ending June 30, 2020 was lower than 6.36 percent, it would trigger risk share, requiring an increase in public-school employees’ contributions.

According to the SEC’s orders, in June 2020, Aon provided PSERS its quarterly returns for the purpose of estimating PSERS’s investment return rate. The orders find that some of the quarterly returns Aon provided to PSERS in 2020 did not match the historical returns that Aon previously provided PSERS for the same periods. According to the SEC’s orders, PSERS repeatedly questioned Aon’s calculations of the investment returns and asked Aon to investigate a discrepancy between the returns. The SEC finds that, in response to these inquiries, Aon and Shaughnessy, who led the PSERS engagement, failed to adequately investigate that discrepancy, instead providing PSERS with two reasons for the discrepancy that Aon had previously ruled out. The orders further find that Shaughnessy misrepresented to PSERS that the discrepancy was not due to errors when, in fact, she did not know the reason for the discrepancy. According to the orders, in December 2020, Aon and Shaughnessy reported to PSERS that the risk share return rate for that period was 6.38 percent – just high enough to avoid triggering risk share. Ultimately, the discrepancy turned out to be due to errors in the underlying data, and, when the rate was recalculated, the corrected return rate was 6.34 percent – triggering risk share and requiring additional employee contributions.

“Investment advisers must be scrupulously honest with their clients,” said LeeAnn G. Gaunt, Chief of the Public Finance Abuse Unit. “Pension funds and other municipal entities should be able to trust that their investment advisers are telling them the truth.”

Without admitting or denying the SEC’s findings, Aon consented to a settled order finding that it violated Section 206(2) of the Advisers Act, censuring it, and ordering it to pay a civil penalty of $1 million and disgorgement and prejudgment interest of $542,187. Without admitting or denying the SEC’s findings, Shaughnessy consented to a settled order finding that she also violated Section 206(2) of the Advisers Act, censuring her, and ordering her to pay a civil penalty of $30,000.

The SEC’s investigation was conducted by Heidi M. Mitza, Joseph O. Chimienti, and Creighton Papier of the Public Finance Abuse Unit and was supervised by Kevin B. Currid. Trial counsel Susan Cooke of the Boston Regional Office also assisted in the investigation.

Back in June 2021 I made a video:

Back to now:

https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2024-01-25/sure-blame-the-compliance-consultant?srnd=undefined

Elsewhere in bad consulting

Here is an SEC enforcement action against Aon Investments USA Inc. that has the quality of a nightmare. Aon acts as an adviser and consultant to the Pennsylvania Public Employees’ Retirement System (PSERS), a public pension fund, and calculates the fund’s investment returns. PSERS asked Aon to do a calculation for it, based on PSERS’s historical returns. The details are not that important, but if the calculation produced a number of 6.36% or higher, that was good. If it produced a number lower than 6.36%, that was bad, and “public school employees would be required to contribute more to the retirement fund going forward.”

In 2020, Aon did the calculation and got 6.38%: close to the line, but fine. But some PSERS employees noticed that “some of the quarterly returns in the spreadsheet provided by Aon did not match the historical quarterly returns previously reported by Aon for those periods.” That is a terrible thing to notice. If your client notices that some of the historical quarterly returns in your spreadsheet do not match the historical quarterly returns in their spreadsheet — or, worse, in your own previous spreadsheets — then the best approach is probably to delete all the spreadsheets, delete Excel, take a baseball bat to your computer, change your name, grow a beard, and set sail for a deserted island. This is not legal or investing or consulting advice but, honestly, what are the chances that you will efficiently identify and fix the source of the discrepancy? Better to start over on an island, far from any spreadsheets. Just read this passage and imagine being Aon Employee A:

On June 17, 2020, PSERS staff asked Aon Employee A to verify the quarterly return rates provided on the spreadsheet for fiscal years 2014-2017 “since some of those are significantly different from what we have on record.” About an hour later, Aon Employee A responded that they “just double checked and the quarterly returns I sent [on June 12] do match what we have in our system.”

On June 19, 2020, PSERS staff asked Aon Employee A whether the discrepancies in return rates that had been identified were due to subsequent adjustments to the return rates that were reported in prior quarterly reports. On the following day, Aon Employee A responded, “I assume so, yes but I don’t know what historical numbers you’re referencing.”

Just the worst possible emails to get. “I assume so, yes but I don’t know what historical numbers you’re referencing” is, in this context, a pretty good answer (not legal advice, and apparently the SEC disliked it), but it would be even better to disclaim even more knowledge. “I’m sorry, I don’t know what historical numbers you’re referencing, or who you are, or what a number is, or how to use email, please never contact me again.” It’s not going to get better. The rest of the SEC order gets worse:

  1. Aon tries to figure out why its numbers are slightly off.
  2. It thinks of promising ideas — maybe one private equity fund in the portfolio retroactively adjusted its performance reporting? — and looks into them and finds out that they don’t explain the discrepancy.
  3. It throws out those ideas to PSERS anyway to, like, suggest that it is on top of the problem? For lack of better ideas? Gotta say something.
  4. PSERS sends around increasingly agitated letters saying things like “I have been unable to locate past documentation provided to the Board that would explain these reporting differences. Perhaps something has been missed, but ….”
  5. Universal despair.

The SEC’s press release says that the Aon partner involved “misrepresented to PSERS that the discrepancy was not due to errors when, in fact, she did not know the reason for the discrepancy,” and that “ultimately, the discrepancy turned out to be due to errors in the underlying data.” But the actual order just sort of trails off. As far as I can tell, nobody ever figured out what happened:

On April 16, 2021, Aon sent an update letter to PSERS’s CIO. Although the Aon Partner had given PSERS the impression that Aon had identified and determined the exact cause of the error, the update letter referred to Aon’s “continued review” and indicated that “Aon fully understands that its responsibility to report to PSERS is ongoing and will supplement the information related here when and to the extent appropriate and, of course, as may be responsive to any questions PSERS may have.” The letter further explained that “all indications are that the issues here reflect inadvertent clerical mistakes at a data-entry level.” The letter concluded that “Aon is determined to ascertain all pertinent details surrounding the issues here and will provide it as our comprehensive review continues.”

Someone just put the wrong numbers in the spreadsheet, somehow, at some point, probably. Nothing to be done about it. Anyway the corrected calculation produced 6.34%, which is bad.